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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Cum. Supp.
1994).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
not

Issue.

further

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in

modifying

Appellant's

alimony

award

based

on

Appellee's receipt of pension benefits awarded to her in the
initial divorce decree.
Standard of Review.

The Court of Appeals "review[s]

both the facts and the law of matters in equity, such as [a]
request for modification of a divorce decree. Boals v. Boals, 664
P.2d

1191

(Utah

1983).

Nonetheless,

[this court]

accord[s]

considerable deference to the judgment of the trial court and
interpose [s] [its] own judgment only where the evidence clearly
preponderates

to the contrary or the trial

discretion or misapplies principles of law."

court

abuses

its

Jeppson v. Jeppson,

684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 668 P.2d 561 (Utah
1983) .
2.

Issue. Was the District Court's finding that "the

issue of defendant receiving retirement has not been considered by
the court in that no evidence was presented to the court in regard

1

to the question of whether said retirement was by way of annuity,
etc.
Standard of Review.

"Findings of fact, whether

based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."
trial

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

court's

factual

findings

"The party challenging the
has

the

heavy

burden

of

establishing that those findings are not supported by substantial
and competent evidence."

Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d

1239,

To satisfy this burden, "an appellant

1242 (Utah 1987).

must first marshall all the evidence supporting the finding and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support

the

findings

even

in viewing

favorable to the court below."

it

in

the

light

most

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,

776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); accord Cornish Town v. Roller, 758
P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988); Cambelt Int'l, 745 P.2d at 1242.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Determinative law in this appeal is principally case law
which is provided in the table of authorities and body of this
brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from a final order modifying the

parties' divorce decree entered in Third Judicial District Court
on or about April 14, 1994.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition.
On or about September 14, 1992, Mrs. Woolsey filed a

Petition to Modify

the Decree of Divorce, claiming

that

the

alimony award should be modified based on her partial loss of
income. (R. 101) . Mr. Woolsey filed a Counter Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce, claiming the alimony award should be reduced
based on an increase in income from Mrs. Woolsey's employment and
the receipt of pension benefits.

(R. 175-177) .

On or about January 25, 1994, a trial was held, at which
time Mrs. Woolsey withdrew her Petition to Modify.

(R. 221,

Findings of Fact paragraph 9 ) . After trial, the District Court
found that Mrs. Woolsey7s income had indeed increased and modified
the alimony award from $500.00 per month to $320.00 per month. (R.
219-221) . In modifying the Divorce Decree, however, the District
Court found insufficient evidence regarding Mrs. Woolsey7s receipt
of retirement benefits to warrant further modification of the
Decree.

(R. 22 0, Findings of Fact paragraph 4 ) .

3

The Order

Modifying Decree of Divorce and Judgment was entered by the court
on or about April 14, 1994.

(R. 223).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. and Mrs. Woolsey were divorced on or about

November 13, 1991.
2.

(R. 90-98).

Based on the length of the parties' marriage, Mrs.

Woolsey's need, her ability to support herself, and Mr. Woolsey's
ability to pay, the court awarded Mrs. Woolsey permanent alimony
in the amount of $500.00 per month. (R. 91).
3.

Furthermore, Mrs. Woolsey was awarded one-half of

all benefits accumulated under the Western Conference of Teamsters
Pension Plan by Mr. Woolsey from the date of marriage until the
trial in the matter. (R. 93).
4.

Provided

the

specific

language

in

the

decree

regarding the distribution of pension benefits, such benefits were
contemplated
distribution.
5.

in

arriving

at

the

alimony

award

and

property

(R. 93-97) .
On or about September 14, 1992, Mrs. Woolsey filed

a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, claiming that the
alimony award should be modified based on her partial loss of
income. (R. 101).
6.

Mr. Woolsey filed a Counter Petition to Modify

Decree of Divorce, claiming, among other things, that the alimony
4

award should be reduced based on an increase in income from Mrs.
Woolsey's employment and the receipt of pension benefits.

(R.

175-177) .
7.

On or about January 25, 1994, a trial was held, at

which time Mrs. Woolsey withdrew her Petition to Modify.

(R. 221,

Findings of Fact paragraph 9 ) .
8.

After trial, the District Court found that Mrs.

Woolsey's income had indeed increased and modified the alimony
award from $500.00 per month to $320.00 per month. (R. 219-221).
9.
insufficient

In those proceedings, the District Court
evidence

regarding

Mrs.

Woolsey's

found

receipt

of

retirement benefits to warrant further modification of alimony.
(R. 220, Findings of Fact paragraph 4 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In the instant case, the district court, in the original
divorce proceedings, plainly contemplated Mrs. Woolsey's future
receipt of retirement benefits.
that

future

Accordingly, the fulfillment of

income does not constitute

a material

change

in

circumstances which would warrant further modification of the
alimony award herein.

Accordingly, the District Court did not

abuse its discretion in not considering the retirement benefits
for such purposes.

5

It is well settled that retirement/pension benefits are
a

marital

asset

dissolution.
parties'

subject

to

equitable

distribution

upon

Inasmuch as Mrs. Woolsey was awarded one-half of the

retirement/pension

benefits

as part

of

the property

distribution in the initial proceedings, the ultimate receipt of
the same should not serve as the basis for a modification of the
decree.
Mr. Woolsey failed to present sufficient evidence at the
modification proceedings as to the nature of the pension benefits
and

its

effect

upon

those

factors

considered

in

determining

alimony to support further modification of the alimony award.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT FURTHER MODIFYING MRS. WOOLSEY'S
ALIMONY AWARD BASED ON HER RECEIPT OF PENSION BENEFITS.
A.
Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of pension benefits was
contemplated at the time of the divorce, therefore, the receipt of
the same would not constitute grounds for modification.
A divorce decree will only be modified upon the showing
of

a

"substantial

change

of

circumstances

subsequent

to the

decree, that was not originally contemplated within the decree
itself."
(emphasis

Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Utah App. 1989}
added).

Accordingly,

"where

a

future

change

in

circumstances is contemplated by the trial court in the divorce
6

decree, the fulfillment of that future change will not constitute
a

material

award."

change

of

circumstances

sufficient

to modify

the

Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App. 1993). 1

"A change in circumstances reasonably contemplated at the time of
divorce is not legally cognizable as a substantial
circumstances in modification proceedings."

change in

Dana v. Dana, 789

P.2d 726, 729 (Utah App. 1990); accord Johnson, 855 P.2d at 253.
In the case at bar, Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of retirement
benefits was certainly contemplated at the time of the entry of
the decree in this matter.

In fact, over four pages of the decree

itself were devoted to the specifics regarding time and manner of
receipt of those retirement benefits.
hereto

as

Addendum

"A."

Yet,

Decree of Divorce attached

despite

the

court's

obvious

contemplation of Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of retirement benefits,
the court also awarded Mrs. Woolsey alimony in the amount of
$500.00 per month.

Accordingly, because Mrs. Woolsey7s ultimate

receipt of the retirement benefits was contemplated by the court

The Johnson court further stated that "[w]e do not
believe it makes for good law or sound policy to have
parties arguing years after the fact over what a trial
court may or may not have considered when making an
alimony award."
Johnson, 855 P.2d at 253.
In the
instant case, there is no argument as to whether the
court considered Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of retirement
benefits inasmuch as the decree speaks for itself.
7

at the time of the entry of the decree, such cannot be the basis
for modification herein.
B. Retirement/pension benefits are marital assets subject to
equitable division upon dissolution; accordingly, a party's
ultimate receipt of the same should not be the basis for
modification of the decree.
"Retirement
normally be

benefits

accrued

during

'considered a marital asset

distribution upon divorce.'"

subject

marriage

must

to equitable

Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1171

(Utah App. 1990) (citing Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah
App. 1989); accord Greene v. Greene. 751 P.2d 827, 829 (Utah App.
1988) .
Just as Mr. Woolsey in the instant action, the Defendant
in Greene argued that "the portion of the decree which awarded
plaintiff one-half of defendant's military retirement benefits
x

may

be

interpreted

only

benefits as income[.]'"

as

treating

defendant's

retirement

The court, however, disagreed, stating

"the military retirement benefits were awarded in addition to
alimony and child support and were awarded as marital property. .
. .

Therefore, because the court's interpretation of the decree

is reasonable and consistent with its previous action enforcing
the $490.00 per month alimony award, we hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the award of military
retirement benefits in the divorce decree constituted marital
property."

Greene, 751 P.2d at 829.
8

Here, the court, during the modification proceeding,
acknowledged

that

it had treated

the retirement

income

as a

marital asset, even in light of the alimony award.
[Counsel for Plaintiff]: The reason I submit
that case is the evidence right there that
the trial court should consider retirement
income in adjust [ing] continuing alimony.
Not only that, but-[The Court] : Then you would necessarily have
to adjust what the property division is,
because this was not treated as income, it
was treated as property.
And I assume I
treated everyone equally.
(R. 309).
This court's decision in

Motes v. Motesf 786 P.2d 232

(Utah App. 1989) is likewise dispositive of the issue at bar.

In

that case, the court ruled that the lower court's postponing
equitable

distribution

of

husband's

retirement

benefits

for

purpose of funding increased child support payments to wife was
error, where the net effect of such approach was to fund husband's
support obligations through what amounted to apportionment of
wife's property. Id. at 235.
In the present case, the Appellant also suggests that
Mrs. Woolsey be required to fund his support obligations through
her property distribution.

However, pursuant to Motes, Mrs.

Woolsey should not be compelled to use those funds which were part
and parcel

of

the property distribution
9

in lieu of

alimony,

particularly in light of the court's acknowledgement that the
original property division was fair and equitable.

(R. 3 09).

This is especially true in light of the additional evidence that
Mrs. Woolsey's expenses still exceeded her income at the time of
the modification proceeding.

(R. 196-198; R. 333-34; Exhibit 24) .

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in not further modifying the divorce decree and
reducing Mrs. Woolsey's alimony based on her receipt of retirement
benefits.
POINT II
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED
AT THE MODIFICATION HEARING REGARDING THE
NATURE OF THE ANNUITY TO WARRANT FURTHER
MODIFICATION OF THE ALIMONY AWARD.
Appellant argues that the District Court's finding that
"there was no evidence presented to the court in regard to the
question of whether said retirement was by way of annuity, etc.
was

clearly

erroneous.

A

review

of

the

record,

however,

demonstrates that there was not sufficient evidence regarding Mrs.
Woolsey's receipt of retirement benefits to warrant the court's
consideration of the same.
As cited by Appellant, an annuity is defined as "a right
to receive fixed, periodic payments, either for life or for a term
of years." Black's Law Dictionary 46 (5th ed. 1983) . While there
10

may have been some evidence relating to the fact that Mrs. Woolsey
was indeed receiving some periodic retirement benefit, i.e. Mrs.
Woolsey's financial declaration, there was no evidence before the
court as to the length or term of the benefit.

Mr. Woolsey

submits that Plaintiff's Exhibit 19 was the sole evidence relating
to the term of the retirement benefit, however the record from the
modification proceedings indicates that Plaintiff's Exhibit 19 was
never offered or admitted.

(R. 217) .

Accordingly, inasmuch as

there was no evidence before the court relating to the length or
term of the benefit, the court could not determine whether such
was an annuity as defined by Appellant.

Therefore, the district

court's finding regarding the annuity is not clearly erroneous.2
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in not
further modifying the parties' divorce decree and further reducing
Mrs. Woolsey's alimony award.

Moreover, the district court's

finding regarding her receipt of the retirement benefits was not
clearly erroneous. Accordingly, this court should affirm judgment
of the district court.
2

Even were this court to determine that the district
court's finding was clearly erroneous, such would be
harmless inasmuch as there was sufficient evidence before
the court that Mrs. Woolsey's receipt of retirement
benefits were certainly contemplated at the time of the
original divorce decree so as to preclude modification on
that basis.
11

DATED this

n

day of March, 1995.

NOLAN J . OLSEN
A t t o r n e y f o r Defei4d^nt/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the <Q2tncn day of March, 1995, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE,
postage prepaid thereon to:
Alan R. Stewart, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
1366 E. Murray-Holladay Road
gait Lake City, Utah 84117
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ADDENDUM "A"

COPY OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
ENTERED NOVEMBER 13, 1991

Third Judicial District

DAVID A. McPHIE (2216)
McPHIE, CONDIE & PECK
Attorneys for Defendant
2105 East Murray-Holladay Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
(801) 278-3700

NOV 1 3 1$

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—

DENNIS W. WOOLSEY,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.

CAROL WOOLSEY,

Civil No. 904903035 DA
Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.

-ooOoo—
The above captioned matter came on for trial at the regularly scheduled time, that being
on Tuesday, the 1st day of October, 1991 at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m. in the Judge
Murphy's courtroom located at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The plaintiff appeared in person by and through his attorney of record, Alan R. Stewart.
The defendant appeared personally and through her attorney of record, David A. McPhie. Prior
to trial the parties read into the record a stipulation dispositive of many of the issues. The court
inquired of both parties if they had heard the stipulation read into the record by their respective
counsel, and if they were willing to be bound by it. Both parties indicated that they had heard
the stipulation and were so willing. Subsequently, counsel for both parties made opening
statement and various witnesses, including the parties, were called, examined, cross-examined,
1
ADDENDUM

"A"

f-. f t n p n

re-examined and re-cross-examined. Counsel for both parties made proffers concerning their
attorney's fees. Closing arguments were made and the court indicated its intention to announce
its findings and ruling on the matter on the morning of Thursday, October 3rd, 1991 at the hour
of 8:15 o'clock a.m.
The court reconvened in the matter on the morning of Thursday, October 3rd, 1991 at
the hour of 8:30 o'clock a.m. and then and there announced its Findings of Fact. Having
previously now published its written Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court now
makes the following:

ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND DECREE

1.

Both of the parties, the plaintiff and defendant are each awarded a Decree of

Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties, the same
to become final upon the signing and entry hereof.
2.

The court has previously found that there are no minor children of the parties,

therefore the court makes no order concerning custody, visitation or child support.
3.

The court awards the defendant alimony in the sum of $500.00 per month

and orders that the plaintiff pay his said sum each month, and that said alimony be paid in two
equal installments, one half due on the 5th, and one half due on the 20th of November of 1991,
and each month thereafter, until such time as said alimony shall be terminated as a matter of
law.
4.

The defendant is awarded the home and real estate of the parties, located at 8311

2

fifino i

South 835 East, Sandy, Utah, as her sole and separate property. The plaintiff is ordered to
execute and deliver to the defendant, a quit claim deed relinquishing to the defendant, except for
the equitable lien referred to immediately below, all of his right title and interest in said real
estate, and to sign and deliver said deed as soon as possible subsequent to the entry of this
Decree of Divorce. The plaintiff is awarded an equitable lien, in and against said home and real
estate in the amount of $26,431.21, which should be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant upon
the occurrance of the first of the following three events.
(1)

The defendant remarrys or co-habitats with another adult male to whom
she is not married;

5.

(2)

At the defendant's death; or

(3)

If the defendant sells the home.

Each of the parties is awarded those items of personal

property (other then retirement benefits, and insurance proceeds which are mentioned with
immediately below) to the party in his possessioif they were as of the date of trial in this matter,
as their sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim of the other party, and subject
to the debt thereon, if any. Specifically, the plaintiff is awarded the truck and fifth wheel
trailer, and is obligated to the second mortgage indebtedness on the home and real estate, and
that he hold the defendant harmless from any liability thereon. An exception to this distribution
of personal property, is that the items listed on exhibit "A" attached hereto a*^EUEDsa% in the
possession of the defendant, anfOsbgo^-ha^iirpfid to thg._glaig4.tfE6. .

The plaintiff is specifically ordered to assume, as his separate debt and obligation,

and pay any tax obligations or penalties incurred in connection with the withdrawal by him

3

00092

between $6,000.00 and $6,400.00 of moneys from IRA accounts during the pendency of these
proceedings.
7*

The plaintiff is ordered to cooperate with the defendant for purposes of signing

any documents, and submitting any paper work necessary to get for and/or deliver to the
defendant, policies of life insurance, with New York Life Insurance Company. The equity or
cash value of said policies is hereby awarded to the defendant. This money is awarded to the
defendant as partial reimbursement of her costs and attorney's fees.
8.

The plaintiff, Dennis W. Woolsey ("Participant") has earned certain benefits under

the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Plan (the "Plan") which are the marital property
of the plaintiff and defendant, ("Alternative Payee") Carol Woosley, and participant. The Court
awards alternate payee, defendant Carol Woolsey, a 50% percent interest in those benefits as
set forth below.
9.

The court orders that the alternate payee, Carol Woolsey be awarded 50% OF all

of the benefits to be paid for the hours of benefit service accumulated by Dennis W: Woolsey
under the plan, between the date of marriage which was on April 8th, 1960, and the date of trial
in this matter, which incurred on Tuesday, October 1st, 1991. For purposes of the above
fraction, hours of benefit service are based on Participants covered hours and years of past
employment under the Plan. Each year, or fraction thereof, of past employment under the Plan
shall count as 1,875 hours of benefit service.
10.

Alternate payee shall begin receiving benefits from the Plan in satisfaction of

alternate payee's fractional interest in participant's retirement benefit on the annuity staring date
elected by alternate payee subject to the following conditions and limitations:

4
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(A)

The annuity starting date elected by alternate payee must be the first day

of a calendar month, must not be before the participant's earliest retirement date (as defined in
the Plan) and must not be more than three months before alternate payee's application for
benefits is received by the Plan.
(B)

Alternate payee's annuity starting date must not be later than the effective

date of participant's retirement benefits.
(C)

Both participant and alternate payee must be alive on alternate payee's

annuity starting date.
(D)

Alternate payee must file with the Plan an application for the benefits on

a form prescribed by the Plan.
(E)

Alternate payee must provide the Plan with whatever information the Plan

reasonably needs to determine alternate payee's entitlement to benefits.
(F)

Participant shall cooperate fully with alternate payee and the Plan to enable

alternate payee to carry out the conditions of this paragraph.
11.

Once the conditions of paragraph 10 are met, the Plan shall pay the following

benefits in satisfaction of alternate payee's fractional interest:
(A)

A monthly single-life annuity in the form elected by alternate payee and

payable to alternate payee on the first day of each month beginning on alternate payee's annuity
starting date and ending with the last payment due before alternate payee's death.
(6)

A lump sum death benefit equal to the less of (i) 12 times alternate

payee's monthly annuity under (A) or (ii) the product of alternate payee's fractional interest and
$10,000, payable upon alternate payee's death to alternate payee's beneficiary.

5
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The amount of alternate payee's monthly annuity shall be set by the Plan so that
the combined single-sum actuarial present value of the monthly annuity and the lump sum death
benefit as of alternate payee's annuity starting date equals the combined single-sum actuarial
present value of alternate payee's fractional interest in participant's normal retirement benefit
under the Plan and alternate payee's fractional interest in any after-retirement lump sum death
benefit that would have been payable to participant's beneficiary had participant elected to retire
on alternate payee's annuity starting date.
12.

If a disability retirement benefit first becomes payable to participant before the

date the participant reaches age 55 and participant and alternate payee both survive to that date,
then the provisions of paragraph 11 shall be applied to that benefit as if the benefit had become
effective on the first day of the month beginning on or just following participant's 55th birthday.
13.

The actuarial assumptions that the Plan uses to implement Qualified Domestic

Relations Orders shall be used to determine actuarial value for purposes of paragraph 12 above.
14.

Unless alternate payee dies before alternate payee's annuity starting date, the

amount of any retirement befit otherwise payable to participant under the Plan and the amount
of any benefits that are figured by reference to the amount of participant's retirement benefit
shall be figured by first reducing participant's total normal retirement benefit by the amount
obtained by multiplying participant's normal retirement benefit as of alternate payee's annuity
starting date (or participant's date of death, if earlier) by alternate payee's fractional interest.
15.

If participant dies before alternate payee's annuity starting date, the Plan shall pay

to alternate payee (or alternate payee's beneficiary if alternate payee predeceases participant) a
lump sum death benefit equal to the amount obtained by multiplying (A) the lump sum death

6
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benefit, if any, payable because of participant's death by (B) alternate payee's fractional interest.
The balance, if any, of such death benefit remaining after deducting the amount payable to
alternate payee or alternate payee's beneficiary shall be paid to participant's beneficiary in
accordance with the terms of the Plan.
16.

If alternate payee survives participant and participant dies before the effective date

of participant's retirement benefit and before alternate payee's annuity starting date, alternate
payee shall be treated by the Plan as a "surviving spouse" of participant for purposes of the
qualified preretirement survivor annuity provisions of the Plan mandated by federal pension law
(ERISA Section 205(e)), but only to the extent of alternate payee's fractional interest in
participant's normal retirement benefit. Any qualified preretirement survivor annuity payable
to any other person because of participant's death shall be figured by first reducing participant's
normal retirement benefit by alternate payee's fractional interest therein. In no event shall
alternate payee receive any portion of the qualified joint and survivor annuity payable under the
Plan pursuant to federal pension law (ERISA Section 205 (e)).
17.

Alternate payee's beneficiary for purposes of any lump sum death benefit payable

pursuant to paragraph 11 or paragraph 15 shall be all of her then surviving children to equally
share and share alike.. Alternate payee may change the identify of alternate payee's beneficiary
at any time by allowing the beneficiary designation procedures in the Plan applicable to Plan
members. If alternate payee's designated beneficiary predeceases alternate payee, the identity
of alternate payee's beneficiary shall be determined using the preference beneficiary rules of the
Plan.
18.

Alternate payee's mailing address is:
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Carol Woolsey
8311 South 835 East
Sandy, Utah 84094

Alternate payee shall keep the Plan advised at all times of alternate payee's current
current mailing address. If participant applies for a retirement benefit or if a lump sum death
benefit becomes payable at participant's death before alternate payee's annuity starting date, the
Plan shall notify alternate payee by first class mail to alternate payee's last address on file with
the Plan.
19.

Participant's mailing address is:
Dennis W. Woolsey
201 Nevada #45
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Participant shall keep the Plan advised at all times of participant's current mailing

address.
20.

The Court retains jurisdiction to make such further orders as are appropriate to

enforce or clarify the provisions of paragraphs 8 through 20.

is A3
DATED this

day of

'//^^YK

UQi^

, 1991.

THE HONORABLE JtJDGE MICHAEL R. MURPHY
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EXHIBIT "A"
PERSONAL PROPERTY CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFF

Truck title
Backpack
4-hanger gun rack
Horseshoe gun rack
Mantle clock
Treewood clock
Metal ammo container with father's possessions in it
Longhorn steer horns and leather kit
Elk horns
Deer horns (unmounted)
Picture of deer
Picture of John Wayne
Arrow made by Doug Wellentine
Personal hunting picture or negatives
Old single shot 12 shotgun
Side racks for pick-up
Old radio of father's
Old rusty 10 gal. milkcan
High school sweater
Timing light in case
Tarp
Old spurs
Mother's leather purse
3-burner gas stove
Coleman lanterns

ADDENDUM "B"

COPY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DATED APRIL 14, 1994

FILED B&7RICTC8&RT
Third Judicial District

APR 1 4 1994

NOLAN J. OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 2464
OLSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-7176

Deputy Cterk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF- UTAH
DENNIS W. WOOLSEY,
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

:

CAROL WOOLSEY,

:

Civil No,

:

Honorable Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.

904903035DA

Plaintiff's and Defendant's Petition to Modify having
come on to be heard on the 25th day of January, 1994, before the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, plaintiff appearing in person and by
his attorney, Alan R. Stewart, and defendant appearing in person
and by her attorney, Nolan J. Olsen, and plaintiff and defendant
having presented evidence to the court, and plaintiff having
testified, and the court having taking said matter under
advisement, and the court having issued its ruling on the 18th day
of March, 1994, and the court having been fully advised in the
premises now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That defendant's income has increased since the time
of Trial on October 1, 1991, and defendant is now earning
$1,043.00 per month, an increase of $180.00 per month since the
time of Trial.
2. That it is fair and reasonable that the alimony be
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reduced in the sum of $180.00.
3. That it is fair and reasonable that commencing in
April, 1994, plaintiff should be ordered to pay to defendant the
sum of $320.00 per month as alimony.
4. That the issue of defendant receiving retirement has
not been considered by the court in that no evidence was presented
to the court in regard to the question of whether said retirement
was by way of annuity, etc.
5. That plaintiff requested that the home be sold and
the court finds that there is no substantial change of
circumstances which would require the sale of said home and the
request by plaintiff that defendant sell said home should be
denied.
6. That plaintiff's Motion to set aside and review the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
pursuant to Rule 60b7 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should be
granted.
7. That the Court finds that the Financial Declaration,
defendant's Exhibit 20, filed by defendant on October 1, 1991, and
signed by defendant on September 30, 1991, did not set forth the
savings defendant had at Key Bank, Credit Union IRA, and a Credit
Union account in the sum of $12,629.48, and plaintiff is entitled
to one half of said funds in that the court divided all other
assets equally and had the court been advised of the fact that
defendant had $12,629.48, plaintiff would have been awarded one
half of said sum at the time of Trial, and defendant should be
ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of $6,314.74.
8. That it is fair and reasonable that plaintiff and
defendant should each be ordered to assume and discharge their
individual court costs and attorney fees with the exception as to
the expenses and time of plaintiff's attorney and paralegal as to
the question of the failure of defendant to reveal the funds set

00220

forth above and based on the time and expenses in regard to said
issue, the court finds that defendant should be ordered to pay to
plaintiff attorney fees in the sum of $520.00.
9. That prior to Trial, defendant withdrew her Petition
to Modify.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That plaintiff's request for the sale of the home be
denied as set forth more fully in the Findings of Fact above.
2. That alimony be awarded as set forth more "fully in
the Findings of Fact above.
3.
That plaintiff be awarded a judgment against
defendant for the sum of $6,314.74 as set forth more fully in the
Findings of Fact above.
4.
That plaintiff be awarded a judgment against
defendant for attorney fees in the sum of $520.00 as set forth
more fully in the Findings of Fact above.
5.
That plaintiff and defendant each assume and
discharge their individual court costs and attorney fees as set
forth more fully in the Findings of Fact above.
6. Defendant's Petition to Modify has been withdrawn and
dismissed.
v
DATED t h i s

\*\

day of

JS<Wyjk

* ^"-19 94.

BY THE COURT:

h
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Alan/ft. ^ e w a r t
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 9H day of ,
j/fhuh
1994, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS
OF FACT, to: Alan R. Stewart, Attorney for Plaintiff, 4885 South
900 East, Suite 306, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, postage prepaid
thereon.
j]

CO???
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COPY OF THE ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60b7
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
DATED APRIL 14, 1994

HLEDBSSTBICTS9OTT
Third Judicial District

|

NOLAN J. OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 2464
OLSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-717 6

By.

APR 1 *» ™
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N r l U

bapotyClerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2W W l

DENNIS W. WOOLSEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE
)DIFYING DECRE]
OF DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 6Ob7
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE ^ \ ° l t ^ P l O

CAROL WOOLSEY,
Defendant.

Civil No. 904903035DA
Honorable Michael R. Murphy

Plaintiff's and Defendant's Petition to Modify having
come on to be heard on the 25th day of January, 1994, before the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, plaintiff appearing in person and by
his attorney, Alan R. Stewart, and defendant appearing in person
and by her attorney, Nolan J. Olsen, and plaintiff and defendant
having presented evidence to the court, and plaintiff having
testified, and the court having taking said matter under
advisement, and the court having issued its ruling on the 18th day
of March, 19 94, and the court having heretofore made and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of
Nolan J. Olsen, attorney for plaintiff, and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1. That plaintiff's request for the sale of the home
located at 8311 South 835 East, Sandy, Utah, be and the same is
hereby denied.
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2.
That the Decree of Divorce in the above entitled
matter be modified as follows:
a. That plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered to pay
to defendant alimony in the sum of $320.00 per month commencing in
April, 1994, and continuing until defendant remarries, cohabits,
or plaintiff or defendant die, or until there is other substantial
change of circumstances as ordered by the court.
3. That plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded a judgment
against defendant for the sum of $6,314.74 for monies that were in
plaintiff's possession at the time of trial which the court was
unaware of and which were not divided by the court.
4. That plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded a judgment
against defendant for attorney fees in the sum of $520.00 for the
time spent on the issue of the judgment pursuant to paragraph 3.
5. That plaintiff and defendant be and they are hereby
each ordered to pay their individual court costs and attorney fees
on all other matters.
1994.
DATED this

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

n wn

I hereby certify that on the
day of K^y
1994, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE, to: Alan R. Stewart, Attorney for
Plaintiff, 4885 South 900 East, Suite 306, Salt Lake City, Utah
84117, postage prepaid thereon.
/)
D I

ML

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ALAN R. CSS'EWART
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
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ADDENDUM "D"

COPY OF PAGE 00309 TRANSCRIPT OF
MODIFICATION HEARING

ALIMONY AWARD.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SAID THAT TRIAL

COURT SHOULD HAVE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT
SHE WAS GOING TO BE RECEIVING THIS PENSION MONEY DOWN THE
ROAD IN MAKING THE ALIMONY AWARD, WHETHER IT BE PERMANENT
OR NOT.
THE REASON I SUBMIT THAT CASE IS THE EVIDENCE
RIGHT THERE THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD CONSIDER
RETIREMENT INCOME IN ADJUST CONTINUING ALIMONY.

NOT ONLY

THAT, B U T —
THE COURT:

THEN YOU WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE- TO

ADJUST WHAT THE PROPERTY DIVISION IS.. BECAUSE THIS WAS
NOT TREATED AS INCOME, IT WAS TREATED

AS PROPERTY.

AND

I ASSUME I TREATED EVERYONE EQUALLY.
MR. OLSEN:

THERE ISN'T ANY QUESTION IN MY

MIND THAT HAD HE RETIRED, AND THEY WERE BOTH RETIRED,
THAT'S A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
APPLICABLE.

THAT WOULD BE A

BUT THAT WOULD CHANGE EVERYTHING.

AND THERE

IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT THE COURT CAN RULE UPON
THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEFENDANT WHO IS FAYING ALIMONY,
THAT AT THAT TIME THE ALIMONY WILL 3E RECONSIDERED.
3UT 3ASICALLY THAT IS A DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME.
IF HE RETIRES AND TAKES HIS INCOME. I'M SURE THAT'S GOINS
TO BE A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE COURT:

CAN WE HAVE A STIPULATION ON THAT.

THAT HER INCOME HAS INCREASED FROM THE TIME OF THE
ADDENDUM " D "
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